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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
CaseNo.20010248-CA
1/

V.

Priority No. 2
JEREMY HILL,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant appeals from a conditional guilty plea to one count of arranging to
distribute a controlled substance, a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE
ANN.

§58-37-8 (1998 & Supp. 2001). This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE

ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1) Does the admission of reliable hearsay at a preliminary hearing, pursuant to
Article I Section 12 of the Utah Constitution, violate a defendant's right to confrontation
under either the United States or the Utah Constitution?
Standard of review. "Issues of constitutional interpretation are questions of law,"
reviewed for correctness. State v. Valencia, 2001 Utah Ct. App. 159,110, 27 P.3d 573.

2) Does the admission of reliable hearsay at a preliminary hearing, pursuant to
Article I Section 12 of the Utah Constitution, deny a defendant his right to a preliminary
hearing?
Standard of review. The standard of review is the same as that for the first issue.
3) Did the State present sufficient evidence at the preliminary hearing to support a
reasonable belief that defendant committed the crimes charged in the information?
Standard of review. "The determination of whether to bind a criminal defendant
over for trial is a question of law" reviewed without deference to the trial court. State v.
Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 8, 20 P.3d 300.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions and rules are contained in Addendum A:
U.S. CONST, amend. VI;
UTAH CONST, art. I, § 12;
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37-8,

58-37a-5 (1998 & Supp. 2001);

Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h);
UtahR.Evid. 1101,1102.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with one count each of distribution of a controlled
substance, a first degree felony; arranging to distribute a controlled substance also a first
degree felony; possession or use of a controlled substance, a third degree felony; and
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor (R. 1-2).
The magistrate bound defendant over on all charges following a preliminary
hearing (R. 18-19). Defendant filed a motion to quash the bindover (R. 25-26, 41-51),
2

which the district court denied (R. 57-58). Defendant then entered a conditional guilty
plea to a reduced charge of arranging to distribute a controlled substance, a second degree
felony, and the State dismissed the remaining charges (R. 79-80, 83-91). Defendant's
conditional plea reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to quash the
bindover (R. 87).
The district court sentenced defendant to thirty-six months probation with the
condition that he serve thirty days in jail - in 96 hour increments - to be completed by 31
December 2001 (R. 97-99, 116-120). The district court also ordered defendant to report
to the jail immediately following sentencing and submit to a drug test (id.). If he tested
negative, he was to be released (id.). But if he tested positive, he was to be immediately
incarcerated for two weeks (id.) Defendant tested positive (R. 108-09, 114-15). He was
released two weeks later with credit for time served (id.).
STATEMENT OF FACTS1
Detective Thomas's testimony at the preliminary hearing:
Events of16 July 1999
At the preliminary hearing the State called detective Clark Thomas of the Central
Utah Narcotics Task Force (R. 125:4). He testified that on 16 July 1999 he was in Mt.
Pleasant, Utah conducting a narcotics investigation (R. 125:5). He and a fellow task force
1

Unless otherwise noted, the facts are recited in a light most favorable to the
prosecution. See State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, K 3, 26 P.3d 223 ("At the preliminary
hearing . . . 'the magistrate should view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution and resolve all inferences in favor of the prosecution.'") (quoting State v.
Talbot, 972 P.2d 435, 438 (Utah 1998)).
3

officer met with a confidential informant at approximately 10:00 p.m. (id.). Detective
Thomas extensively searched both the informant and his vehicle, then supplied him with
currency and a monitoring device (R. 125:5, 13-15). The informant entered the Triangle
Bar while the officers waited outside (R. 125:5, 16-17).
The informant met defendant's brother, Mitchell Hill, inside the bar (R. 125:6-7,
12). Mitchell explained that defendant would arrive shortly with methamphetamine for
sale (id.). When defendant arrived he and the informant left the bar (id.). Detective
Thomas then observed defendant sell one gram of methamphetamiine to the informant for
$60.00 (R. 125:7-8). The informant reentered the bar momentarily, then exited and met
Detective Thomas at a prearranged location (R. 125:8, 17, 21-22). There, Detective
Thomas again searched the informant extensively and the informant delivered one gram
of methamphetamine (R. 125:8,16).
Although Detective Thomas could not recall whether the substance was field
tested, he testified that, in his experience, the appearance of the substance was consistent
with methamphetamine and that it had been purported to be methamphetamine (R. 125:8,
16). He also testified that the Triangle Bar was located within 1,000 feet of an arcade, a
church and a school (R. 125:8-9).
Events of 3! July 2001
Detective Thomas then testified that on 31 July 2001 he conducted a second
narcotics investigation in Mt. Pleasant (R. 125:9). A confidential informant had
previously informed Detective Thomas that defendant and his brother were transporting
4

one-half ounce of methamphetamine to Mt. Pleasant (id.). Detective Thomas placed a
monitoring device on the informant and the informant made arrangements to meet
defendant and his brother at 64 West Main (id.).
As Detective Thomas and other task force officers watched the 64 West Main
location, defendant and his brother arrived in a truck (R. 125:9-10, 11). Defendant was
driving (R. 125: 27). Both were arrested before any drug transaction took place (R.
125:9-10). The arrests occurred within 1000 feet of an arcade, church, and school (R.
125:10).
Detective Thomas testified that task force officers searched defendant's truck
following the arrests (R. 125:10). At this point defense counsel objected to Detective
Thomas testifying about the actions of other officers on the grounds that it violated
defendant'srightto confrontation under both the Utah and United States Constitutions (R.
125:11). The magistrate overruled the objection (id.). Detective Thomas then testified
that Commander Pierson found two yellowish rocky substances in two plastic bags inside
a Camel cigarette container under thefrontseat of defendant's truck (R. 125:10-11, 27).
The substance filed tested positive as methamphetamine (R. 125:10). Detective Thomas
could not recall, however, whether he or another officer performed the field test (R.
125:23-24). No lab test results were provided (R. 125:23). Over defendant's continuing
objection Detective Thomas also testified that Officer Thayne located a glass pipe
covered with white powdery residue inside a compartment in the driver's side door of
defendant's truck (R. 125: 10-12, 27).
5

Defendant confesses
Following their arrests both defendant and his brother provided urine samples that
tested positive for methamphetamine (R. 125:11, 26). Detective Thomas also interviewed
defendant (R. 125:12). After one of the other officers advised defendant of his Miranda
rights, defendant admitted that he had purchased the half ounce of methamphetamine in
Salt Lake City and that he had arranged to sell it to an individual named Mike who lived
in the back of a video store located at 64 West Main in Mt. Pleasant (R. 125:12, 26).
Defendant also admitted that he and his brother had smoked some of the
methamphetamine while traveling from Salt Lake to Mt. Pleasant (id.).
Cross-examination of Detective Thomas
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Detective Thomas to reveal the
identity of the confidential informant (R. 125:13). The prosecutor objected and the
magistrate sustained the objection (id.). The prosecutor acknowledged, however, that
while he would eventually have to divulge the informant's identity, he objected to doing
so at the preliminary hearing because the informant was still working with the task force
(R. 125:13,17).
Nevertheless, the magistrate allowed defense counsel to probe Detective Thomas
regarding the informant's reliability (R. 125:18-21). Over the prosecutor's objection,
defense counsel asked whether Detective Thomas had ever arrested the informant (R.
125:18). Detective Thomas testified that he had not (id.). He also testified that the

6

informant was not receiving financial compensation for his services, but was assisting the
task force to have a third-party's charges dismissed (R. 125:19).
At this point defense counsel asked the magistrate to continue the preliminary
hearing until the prosecution could disclose the informant's identity (R. 125:19-20). The
magistrate denied the motion (R. 125:20). Defense counsel then inquired about the
informant's criminal history (id.). Detective Thomas testified that the informant was on
probation (id.). He also testified that the informant had been reliable on ten or more
occasions, and that he did not believe the informant had never lied to him (R. 125:20-21).
The informant had also been trained regarding entrapment issues (R. 125:22). Defense
counsel then requested a copy of the packet of information regarding entrapment issues
that the task force provides informants (R. 125: 23). Detective Thomas explained that he
could provide defense counsel with a copy if his commander agreed (id.).
Defense counsel also repeatedly asked Detective Thomas to relate, verbatim, the
monitored conversations between defendant, Mitchell, and the informant (R. 125:18, 21,
23). Detective Thomas could not recall the conversations verbatim, but explained that he
would produce the audio tape recordings of the 16 and 31 July events to both the
prosecutor and defense counsel (R. 125:17, 18, 21, 23).
Following Detective Thomas's testimony, defense counsel again asked the
magistrate to continue the preliminary hearing on the ground that defendant had been
denied hisrightto confrontation (R. 125:28). The magistrate again denied the motion and
bound defendant over on all charges (R. 18-19, 125:29).
7

Defendant never filed a formal discovery request (see Record generally).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Point I. The admission of reliable hearsay at a preliminary hearing does not
violate a criminal defendant's right to confrontation under either ihe Utah or the United
States Constitution. The Utah Constitution explicitly allows the admission of reliable
hearsay at a preliminary hearing, and the United States Supreme Court has held that the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment does not apply to preliminary hearings.
Point II. The use of reliable hearsay at a preliminary hearing does not deprive a
criminal defendant of hisrightto a preliminary hearing. Although a defendant may seek
to use a preliminary hearing as a discovery device, the purpose of a preliminary hearing is
constitutionally limited to determining probable cause. Sound policy supports this
limitation. Requiring a defendant to pursue discovery through the procedures provided in
rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, rather than the preliminary hearing, does not
deny a defendant his right to a preliminary hearing.
Point III. In this case the State presented ample evidence to support a reasonable
belief that defendant committed the offenses charged in the information. Contrary to
defendant's representation, most of the evidence establishing probable cause was not
hearsay, but consisted of defendant's confession and the testifying officer's direct
observations. The small amount of hearsay evidence that was necessary to the finding of
probable cause was "reliable hearsay" as defined by rule 1102, Utah Rules of Evidence.

8

ARGUMENT
I.

THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSES OF THE UTAH AND
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS DO NOT APPLY AT
PRELIMINARY HEARINGS

Defendant argues that the confrontation clauses of both the Utah and United States
Constitutions apply to preliminary hearings. See Br. of Aplt. at 7. However, neither the
State nor the Federal Constitution extend confrontation rights to preliminary hearings.
A.

The confrontation clause of the Utah Constitution does not
apply at preliminary hearings.

Defendant cites State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 785 (Utah 1980), to support his
assertion that the confrontation clause of the Utah Constitution applies at a preliminary
hearing. See Br. of Aplt. at 12-15. The Anderson court held that "the protections
afforded by the right of confrontation . . . must be guaranteed the accused at the
preliminary hearing." 612 P.2d at 785. The viability of Anderson, however, has been
seriously debated. See Mark L. Allred, Comment, Confrontation Rights and Preliminary
Hearings, 1986 UTAH L. REV. 75, 81-90.
For example, not long after Anderson, the Utah Supreme Court expressly stated
that "on the issue of defendants' right to confrontation, we hold that the Utah
Constitutional provision, Article I, Section 12, should be construed the same as the
Federal Constitutional provision." State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 542 (Utah 1981). The
federal view is that confrontation rights do not apply at preliminary hearings. See Point I,

9

B below. Thus, Brooks indirectly disavowed the language in Anderson upon which
defendant relies.
The Utah Supreme Court further underscored its rejection of this portion of
Anderson when it promulgated the original Utah Rules of Evidence and Criminal
Procedure. See Paul G. Cassell, Balancing the Scales ofJustice: The Case for and the
Effects of Utah's Victims' Rights Amendment, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1373,1433-34. The
court adopted all of the simultaneously repealed Code of Criminal Procedure except for
two provisions, which it viewed as inconsistent with its previous decisions. Id. at 1433.
Among the provisions adopted by the court was the provision allowing hearsay at
preliminary hearings. See Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h)(2) ("The findings of probable cause may
be based on hearsay in whole or in part."). The court did so despite its holding in
Anderson, and its earlier adoption of rules 1101(a) & (b), Utah Rules of Evidence, which
extended the rules of evidence, including the prohibition on hearsay, to all court
proceedings including preliminary hearings.2 See Cassell, Balancing the Scales of
Justice, 1994 UTAH L. REV. at 1433-34 and accompanying notes.
Any confusion over the applicability of therightto confrontation in Utah's
preliminary hearings was resolved with the 1995 amendment to Article I, Section 12 of
the Utah Constitution. When Anderson was decided in 1980, the Utah Constitution stated
2

In 1995, rule 1101, Utah Rules of Evidence was amended to state that "In a
criminal preliminary examination, nothing in these rules shall be construed to prevent the
admission of reliable hearsay evidence/" Utah R. Evid. 1101 (1995). The rule was again
amended in 1999 to state that "In a criminal preliminary examination, reliable hearsay
shall be admissibte as provided under Rule 1102." Utah R. Evid. 1101 (1999).
10

that "[i]n criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right... to be confronted by
the witnesses against him." UTAH CONST, art. I, § 12. The 1995 amendment, however,
explicitly allows the admission of reliable hearsay at a preliminary hearing. It states in
relevant part:
Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay
evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary
examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as
defined by statute or rule.
UTAH CONST,

art. I, § 12. Thus, by explicitly allowing the admission of reliable hearsay

at preliminary hearings, the 1995 amendment overruled Anderson and clarified that the
right of confrontation does not apply at a preliminary hearing. See Cassell, Balancing the
Scales of Justice, 1994 UTAH L. REV. at 1440; see also Utah R. Evid. 1102 advisory
committee's note (observing that the 1995 constitutional amendment abrogated
Anderson).
The Utah Supreme Court acknowledged the nullification of Anderson in State v.
Clarkr 2001UT 9, f 16 n.3,20 P.3d 300. Whereas Anderson was decided on the premise
that "[t]he probable cause showing necessary in the preliminary examination differs from
that required for an arrest warrant/' 612 P.2d at 783, the court announced in Clark that it
no longer saw "a principled basis for attempting to maintain a distinction between the
arrest warrant probable cause standard and the preliminary hearing probable cause
standard." Clark, 2001 UT 9, ^ 16, 20 P.3d 300. Ironically, Anderson acknowledged that
the finding of probable cause in the context of an arrest warrant usually rests exclusively
il

on hearsay evidence. 612 P.2d at 783 n. 11 (citing Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307,
79 S. Ct. 329 (1959)). Additionally, the Clark court noted that Anderson viewed the
preliminary examination not as a one-sided determination of probable cause, but an
adversarial proceeding in which certain procedural safeguards are recognized. Id. at n.3.
The Clark court then observed that "this distinction has been somewhat reduced by the
recent amendment to the Utah Constitution allowing for the admission of 'reliable
hearsay evidence' at 'preliminary examinations.'" Id.
In sum, by explicitly allowing the admission of reliable hearsay at preliminary
hearings, the 1995 amendment to Article I, Section 12 overruled Anderson's holding that
the right to confrontation extended to preliminary hearings. Thus, Anderson does not
support defendant's position.
B.

The confrontation clause of the United States Constitution
does not apply at preliminary hearings.

Defendant acknowledges that the 1995 amendment "may modify therightto
confront witnesses [at preliminary hearings] under Utah Constitutional law." Br. of Aplt.
at 10. He nevertheless argues that the Utah constitutional amendment violates the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution which, according to defendant, grants a
criminal defendant the right to confrontation at a preliminary hearing. Br. of Aplt. at 1015. However, as the Utah Supreme Court observed, "the United States Supreme Court
has held that the protections afforded criminal defendants by the Confrontation Clause do

12

not extend to preliminary hearings." State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.4 (Utah
1995) (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120-22, 95 S. Ct. 854, 866-67 (1975)).
The very nature of the right to confrontation renders it inapplicable at a
preliminary hearing. Confrontation is not synonymous with "cross examination." Barber
v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725, 88 S. Ct. 1318,1322 (1968). Rather, confrontation "includes
both the opportunity to cross-examine and the occasion for the jury to weigh the
demeanor of the witness" Id. (emphasis added). Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court
observed that "[t]he essence of the confrontation right is the opportunity to have the
accusing witness in court and subject to cross-examination, so that bias and credibility
can be evaluated by the finder of fact" State v. Nelson, 125 P2d 1353, 1356 (Utah 1986)
(citing Anderson, 612 P.2d at 785) (emphasis added). Thus, a principle purpose of
confrontation is to provide the fact-finder with the opportunity to assess a witness's
credibility. See Barber, 390 U.S. at 721, 725, 88 S. Ct at 1320, 1322.
The magistrate presiding over a preliminary hearing, however, "is precluded from
evaluating the weight of otherwise credible evidence." State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 435, 438
(Utah 1998). Rather, "the magistrate's evaluation of credibility at a preliminary hearing is
limited to determining that 'evidence is wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable
inference to prove some issue which supports the [prosecution's] claim.'" Id. (quoting
Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229). Thus, because credibility determinations are extremely
limited at a preliminary hearing, the right to confrontation, by its very nature, is
inapplicable. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that "the
13

right to confrontation is basically a trial right." Barber, 390 U.S. at 725, 88 S. Ct. at 1322
(emphasis added); see also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 193435 (1970) ("it is this literalrightto 'confront' the witnesses at the time of trial that forms
the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause.") (emphasis added).
Case law supports this conclusion. First, there is no federal constitutional right to
a preliminary hearing to determine whether a case should proceed to trial. See Lem Woon
v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586, 590, 33 S. Ct. 783, 784 (1913); Gerstein 420 U.S. at 119, 95 S.
Ct. at 865. Thus, if a state grants an accused therightto a preliminary hearing, it does so
purely as a matter of state law.
If a state provides a criminal defendant with a preliminary hearing where the
accused is allowed to cross-examine prosecution witnesses and may demand the dismissal
of charges not supported by probable cause, then the Sixth Amendment guarantees the
assistance of counsel at that hearing. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10, 90 S. Ct.
1999, 2003 (1970). Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court later held that if the
issue is simply determining whether probable cause exists, the issue "can be determined
reliably without an adversary hearing." Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120, 95 S. Ct.
854, 866 (1975). Indeed, probable cause "traditionally has been decided by a magistrate
in a nonadversary proceeding on hearsay and written testimony." Id. Thus, the United
States Supreme Court has never held the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
applicable to preliminary hearings. See Goldsby v. United States, 160 U.S. 70,73, 16 S.
Ct. 216, 218 (1895) ("The contention . . . that because there had been no preliminary
14

examination of the accused, he was thereby deprived of his constitutional guaranty to be
confronted by the witnesses, by mere statement, demonstrates its error."); 4 WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

§ 14.4(C), at 172 (2nd ed. 1999) ("[T]he Supreme

Court has long held that cross-examination at a preliminary hearing is not required by the
confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment."). Accordingly, neither Utah nor the
United States Constitution guarantees the right to confrontation at preliminary hearings.
II.

THE ADMISSION OF RELIABLE HEARSAY AT A
PRELIMINARY HEARING DOES NOT DENY A
DEFENDANT HIS RIGHT TO A PRELIMINARY HEARING
A.

A preliminary hearing is not a discovery device.

Defendant argues that the admission of reliable hearsay effectively denied him his
right to a preliminary hearing because it prevented him from developing testimony for use
as impeachment at trial, preserving favorable testimony for trial, and using the
preliminary hearing as a discovery device. Br. of Aplt at 9-10, 15-16. This argument
ignores the constitutionally limited purpose of a preliminary hearing. The purpose of a
preliminary hearing is not to develop potential impeachment for trial, preserve favorable
testimony, or discover the State's case. UTAH CONST, art. I, § 12. Instead, "the function
of [a preliminary] examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists
unless otherwise provided by statute." Id. (emphasis added).
Sound policy supports this limitation on the scope of preliminary hearings. Rule
16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides defendants with the right to discovery.
See Utah R. Crim. P. 16; Cassell, Balancing the Scales of Justice, 1994 UTAH L. REV. at

1453. The State incurs significant costs when defendants are allowed to circumvent rule
16 by using the hearing as a discovery device and preventing the admission of reliable
hearsay. See Cassell, Balancing the Scales ofJustice, 1994 UTAH L. REV. at 1437-1440
("The bar against hearsay evidence at preliminary hearings . . . places a significant claim
on state resources."). The length of preliminary hearings is also significantly increased.
Id Thus, allowing reliable hearsay at preliminary hearings and requiring defendant's to
use rule 16 to conduct discovery, rather than the preliminary hearing, promotes both fiscal
and judicial economy.
Moreover, the 1995 amendment to the Utah Constitution moved Utah back into
harmony with the majority of states on the discovery issue. See Cassell, Balancing the
Scales ofJustice, 1994 UTAH L. REV. at 1453; 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ET AL., CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE

§14.1(a), at 110 (2nd ed. 1999). Most states agree that the purpose of a

preliminary hearing is to allow for an independent screening of the prosecutions decision
to charge. Id.; see also, Allred, Confrontation Rights and Preliminary Hearings, 1986
UTAH

L. REV. at 84-86 (noting that most states adhere to the position that "[i]t is not the

purpose of the preliminary examination to provide a means for the discovery of
evidence.").
In this case, defendant attempted to conduct discovery by means of his preliminary
hearing, rather rule 16, the means provided by law. While the admission of reliable
hearsay may have hindered defendant from manipulating the preliminary hearing to serve
his discovery-oriented purposes, such a result was justified by the constitutional limitation
16

on the scope of preliminary hearings. Defendant should have pursued his discovery under
the rules of criminal procedure rather than attempting to expand the purpose of the
preliminary hearing.
B.

The admission of reliable hearsay does not deny defendant
the opportunity to challenge the strength of the State's
probable cause showing.

Defendant also argues that the admission of reliable hearsay effectively denied his
right to a preliminary hearing because it prevented him from exposing any weaknesses in
the State's case. Br. of Aplt. at 9-10,15-16. The right to challenge the State's showing
of probable cause at a preliminary hearing, however, is protected by the right to counsel,
not the right to confrontation. See Coleman, 399 U.S. at 9, 90 S. Ct. at 2003 (requiring
the assistance of counsel at preliminary hearings); Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 120,95 S. Ct.
866 (1975) (holding that probable cause may be based on hearsay and determined without
adversary safeguards). Defendant was represented by counsel at the preliminary hearing
who cross-examined the prosecution witness and had an opportunity to call witnesses in
defendant's behalf (R. 125:13-29). Thus, the admission of reliable hearsay may have
prevented defendant from manipulating the preliminary hearing to serve his discoveryoriented purposes, but it did not impair his right to a fair hearing.
Furthermore, defendant was not prejudiced by the admission of reliable hearsay
because a preliminary hearing magistrate "[was] precluded from evaluating the weight of
otherwise credible evidence." See Talbot, 972 P.2d at 438. When hearsay evidence is
reliable, it is necessarily credible, and the magistrate must accept the evidence without
17

weighing it. Id. Thus, even if defendant could have cross-examined and impeached a
hearsay declarant, it would not have affected the magistrate's evaluation of the evidence.
Accordingly, the admission of reliable hearsay did not deny defendant his right to a
preliminary hearing. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 120, 95 S. Ct. at 866 (noting that probable
cause "traditionally has been decided by a magistrate in a nonadversay proceeding on
hearsay and written testimony.").
III.

THE STATE PRODUCED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AT THE
PRELIMINARY HEARING TO SUPPORT A REASONABLE
BELIEF THAT DEFENDANT COMMITTED THE CRIMES
CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION

The State charged defendant with one count each of distribution of a controlled
substance, arranging to distribute a controlled substance, possession or use of a controlled
substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia (R. 1-2). Defendant contends that the
magistrate's bindover order on each of these charges was improper because the State
relied entirely on hearsay to establish probable cause that he committed these crimes. Br.
of Apit. at 15-16. Contrary to defendant's characterization, however, most of the
evidence that the State introduced at the preliminary hearing was not hearsay, but
consisted of defendant's confession and the testifying officer's direct observations. What
little hearsay was necessary to establish probable cause was reliable hearsay, as defined
by rule 1102, Utah Rules of Evidence.
The Utah Supreme Court clarified the bindover standard in State v. Clark, 2001
UT 9, f 16, 20 P.3d 300. At a preliminary hearing, the prosecution need only present
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"sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed
and that the defendant committed it." Id. The court equated this standard to "the arrest
warrant probable cause standard," and noted that "the quantum of evidence necessary to
support a bindover is less than that necessary to survive a directed verdict motion." Id. In
determining whether evidence at a preliminary hearing is sufficient to support a bindover,
a magistrate must view all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to
the prosecution. Id. at f 10. "When faced with conflicting evidence, the magistrate may
not sift of weigh the evidence . . . but must leave those tasks to the fact finder at trial." Id.
(quoting State v. Hester, 2000 Utah Ct. App. 159 f 7, 3 P.3d 725).
As discussed above, reliable hearsay is admissible at a preliminary hearing. UTAH
CONST,

art. I, § 12; Utah R. Evid. 1101, 1102. In addition, "The findings of probable

cause [at a preliminary hearing] may be based on hearsay in whole or in part." Utah R.
Crim. P. 7(h)(2).
A.

The evidence supported a reasonable belief that defendant
distributed a controlled substance.

To establish probable cause that defendant distributed a controlled substance, in
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(1 )(a)(ii) (1998 & Supp. 2001), the State had to
produce evidence supporting a reasonable belief that defendant "delivered] other than by
administering or dispensing a controlled substance/' Id. at § 58-37-2(1 )(n). The State
met its burden.

19

At the preliminary hearing Detective Thomas testified that he observed defendant
deliverrnethamphetamineto the informant in exchange for $60.00 (R. 125:7-8). This
testimony was not hearsay, but was based on Detective Thomas's direct observation.
There was also sufficient evidence to establish a reasonable belief that the
substance delivered was a controlled substance. Although no field or lab tests were
conducted, Detective Thomas testified that, in his experience, the appearance of the
substance was consistent withrnethamphetamine.This testimony was non-hearsay. He
also testified that he had overheard defendant's brother tell the informant that defendant
would arrive withrnethamphetaminefor sale (R. 125:6-8,12). Although this testimony
was hearsay, it constituted reliable hearsay as defined by rule 1102, Utah Rules of
Evidence and was therefore admissible.
Rule 1102 defines reliable hearsay, in part, as "hearsay evidence admissible at trial
under Rule 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, regardless of the availability of the
declarant at the preliminary examination." Utah R. Evid. 1102(b)(2). The statement of
defendant's brother, that defendant would arrive at the bar with rnethamphetamine to sell
(R. 125:6-7), satisfied this definition because it constituted a statement against interest
under rule 804(3), Utah Rules of Evidence.
A statement against interest is one which "at the time of its making . . . so far
tend[s] to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, that a reasonable person in the
declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true."
Utah R. Evid. 804(3). Here, the statement of defendant's brother, coupled with
20

defendant's arrival and subsequent sale of methamphetamine to the informant (R. 125:68), arguably amounted to the crime of arranging to distribute a controlled substance. See
State v. Hester, 2000 Utah Ct. App. 159, f 9, 3 P.3d 725 (holding that the offense of
arranging consists of an intentional or knowing offer or arrangement to distribute
controlled substances coupled with an act in furtherance of the arrangement). Thus, the
statement of defendant's brother was against he penal interest and therefore amounted to
a statement against interest under Rule 804(3), Utah Rules of Evidence. This statement
against interest was admissible at defendant's preliminary hearing as reliable hearsay.
UtahR. Evid. 1101(c), 1102(b)(2).
This reliable hearsay, coupled with the Detective's personal observations regarding
the characteristics of the substance, was sufficient to support a reasonable belief that the
substance the defendant delivered to the informant was indeed methamphetamine. See
State v. Rodriguez-LopU 954 P.2d 1290, 1293 (Utah 1998) (holding that even without a
toxicology report, an officer's testimony that the substance's appearance was consistent
with cocaine, coupled with defendant's own statement identifying the substance as
cocaine, was sufficient for bindover). When considered with Detective Thomas's
observation of the actual delivery of the methamphetamine in exchange for $60.00, this
evidence supported a reasonable belief that defendant distributed a controlled substance.
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B.

The evidence supported a reasonable belief that
defendant arranged to distribute a controlled
substance.

To establish probable cause thai defendant arranged to distribute a controlled
substance, the State had to produce evidence supporting a reasonable belief that defendant
intentionally or knowingly "offerfed] agreefd], consented], or airrange[d] to distribute
controlled substances." See Hester, 2000 Utah Ct. App. 159, % 9, 3 P.3d 725.
Additionally, the State had to show that "the defendant... committed some 'act in
furtherance of an arrangement' to distribute controlled substances." Id. at ^ 10 (quoting,
State v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1979)). The State satisfied this burden at the
preliminary hearing.
Detective Thomas testified that defendant confessed to purchasing a half ounce of
methamphetamine in Salt Lake City and arranging to sell it to an individual named Mike
who lived in the back of a video store at 64 West Main in Mt. Pleasant (R. 125:12, 26).
This statement was not hearsay, because it was an admission of a party-opponent. See
Utah R. Evid 801(d)(2).
Detective Thomas also testified that defendant was arrested at the 64 West Main
location and that officers found a half ounce of methamphetamine under thefrontseat of
his truck (R. 125:9-11,27). The testimony regarding the fruits of another officer's search
was hearsay. See Utah R. Evid. 801. Nevertheless, reliable hearsay includes "a statement
of a non-testifying peace officer to a testifying peace officer." Utah R. Evid. 1102(b)(6).
Thus, Detective Thomas's testimony regarding the fruits of the search was reliable
22

hearsay and admissible at the preliminary hearing. UTAH CONST, art. I, §12; Utah R.
Evid. 1101(c).
Detective Thomas also testified that the substance recovered from the under the
front seat of the truck field tested positive as methamphetamine, that defendant had
admitted that it was methamphetamine, and that defendant tested positive for
methamphetamine use after his arrest (R. 125:10, 12). As discussed above, this evidence
was sufficient to support a reasonable belief that the substance was methamphetamine.
See Rodriguez-Lopi, 954 P.2d at 1293.
Thus, defendant's admission that he had arranged to sell one-half ounce of
methamphetamine to an individual at the location where he was arrested, coupled with the
reliable hearsay evidence that one-half ounce of methamphetamine was found in
defendant's truck, supported a reasonable belief that defendant arranged to distribute a
controlled substance.
C.

The evidence supported a reasonable belief that
defendant possessed or used a controlled substance.

The State also produced sufficient evidence to establish probable cause that
defendant possessed or used a controlled substance, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §
58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998 & Supp. 2001). Detective Thomas testified that defendant
admitted to both possession and use of methamphetamine (R. 125:12, 26). As noted
above, this testimony was not hearsay under rule 801(d)(2), Utah Rules of Evidence.
Detective Thomas also testified that defendant tested positive for methamphetamine use
23

(R. 125:11, 26). Again, this testimony was not hearsay, but was based on Detective
Thomas's personal observation (id.). Finally, Detective Thomas's testimony that another
officer recovered methamphetamine from defendant's truck was reliable hearsay because,
as noted above, it was the statement of a fellow peace officer. See Utah R. Evid.
1102(b)(6). This evidence was sufficient to produce a reasonable belief that defendant
possessed or used a controlled substance.
D.

The evidence supported a reasonable belief that defendant
possessed drug paraphernalia.

The State also produced sufficient evidence to establish probable cause that
defendant possessed drug paraphernalia, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5(l)
(1998). Detective Thomas testified that defendant confessed to having smoked
methamphetamine on his trip from Salt Lake to Mr. Pleasant, and defendant tested
positive for methamphetamine use (R. 125:11-12, 26). Again, this testimony was not
hearsay. See Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(2). Detective Thomas also testified that Officer
Thayne located a glass pipe covered with white powdery residue inside a compartment in
the driver's side door of the truck defendant was driving (R. 125:10-12, 27). As
discussed above, although this testimony regarding a fellow officer's statement was
hearsay, it was admissible as reliable hearsay under rule 1102(b)(6), Utah Rules of
Evidence. All of this evidence supported a reasonable belief that defendant possessed
drug paraphernalia.
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Thus, the State produced ample evidence to support a reasonable belief that
defendant committed each of the crimes charged in the information. The magistrate
therefore properly bound defendant over on the charges.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the trial court's refusal to
quash the bindover.
Respectfully submitted this l(

day of October, 2001.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM "A"

U.S. CONST, amend. VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted
with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defense.
UTAH CONST, art. I, § 12

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have therightto appear and defend
in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of
the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure therightsherein
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself;
a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole
or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any
pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate
discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 58-37-8 (1998 & Supp. 2001)

(I) Prohibited acts A - Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to
knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce,
manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent,
offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where:
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results
in any violation of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c,
or 37d that is a felony; and
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations
of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate occasions that
are undertaken in concert with five or more persons with respect to
whom the person occupies a position of organizer, supervisor, or any
other position of management.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a controlled substance analog
is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or subsequent
conviction is guilty of a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a
third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of
a second degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A misdemeanor
and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third degree
felony.
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (l)(a)(ii)
or (iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as
provided by law, but if the trier of fact fmds a firearm as defined in Section
76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his immediate
possession during the commission or in furtherance of the offense, the court
shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run
consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the
person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run
consecutively and not concurrently.
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (I )(a)(iv) is guilty of a first
degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less

than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or execution of the
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation.
(2) Prohibited acts B - Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled
substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order,
directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional
practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building,
room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and
intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully
possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those
locations; or
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or
forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second
degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is
more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance
analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from
any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less than
16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the
exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as defined
in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement shall be
sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in Subsection (2)(b).
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any controlled
substance by a person, that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater
penalty than provided in this Subsection (2).
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii),
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and
upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is guilty of a third degree
felony.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and

(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony.
(3) Prohibited acts C - Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled
substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or
issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a controlled
substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to be, a manufacturer,
wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized
person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the
administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to
any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or to
procure the administration of any controlled substance by misrepresentation
or failure by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled substance
from another source,fraud,forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a
prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or the use of a false
name or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription or
written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other
thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or
other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any likeness of any
of the foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling so as to render any
drug a counterfeit controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third
degree felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D - Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized
under this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this
section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58,
Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is upon conviction subject
to the penalties and classifications under Subsection (4)(b) if the act is
committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds
of any of those schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or
on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or
grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity

sponsored by or through a school or institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i)
and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center;
(vi) in a church or synagogue;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie
house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure;
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in
Subsections (4)(a)(i) through (viii); or
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of age,
regardless of where the act occurs.
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of afirstdegree
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsection
would have been afirstdegree felony. Imposition or execution of the sentence
may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have
been less than afirstdegree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person
convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more than the
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor
mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of
the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the actor
mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred was not as
described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location where the act
occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a).
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B
misdemeanor.
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and not
in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law.
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another
state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for
the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state.
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that the
person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance or
substances.
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course of

his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, or
administering controlled substances orfromcausing the substances to be
administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and supervision.
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance for
use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the
ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of his
employment.
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any
person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be
given effect without the invalid provision or application.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 58-37a-5

(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture,
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store,
contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled
substance into the human body in violation of this chapter. Any person who
violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or
manufacture with intent to deliver, any drug paraphernalia, knowing that the drug
paraphernalia will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest,
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack,
repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce a
controlled substance into the human body in violation of this act. Any person who
violates this subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug paraphernalia to a
person under 18 years of age who is three years or more younger than the person
making the delivery is guilty of a third degree felony.
(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any newspaper, magazine,
handbill, or other publication any advertisement, knowing that the purpose of the
advertisement is to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia. Any person who
violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.

Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h)
(h)(1) Unless otherwise provided, a preliminary examination shall be held under
the rules and laws applicable to criminal cases tried before a court. The state has
the burden of proof and shall proceed first with its case. At the conclusion of the
state's case, the defendant may testify under oath, call witnesses, and present
evidence. The defendant may also cross-examine adverse witnesses.
(2) Iffromthe evidence a magistrate finds probable cause to believe that the
crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it, the
magistrate shall order, in writing, that the defendant be bound over to answer in
the district court. The findings of probable cause may be based on hearsay in
whole or in part. Objections to evidence on the ground that it was acquired by
unlawful means are not properly raised at the preliminary examination.
(3) If the magistrate does not find probable cause to believe that the crime
charged has been committed or that the defendant committed it, the magistrate
shall dismiss the information and discharge the defendant. The magistrate may
enter findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order of dismissal. The dismissal
and discharge do not preclude the statefrominstituting a subsequent prosecution
for the same offense.
Utah R.Evid. 1101
(a) Courts and magistrates. These rules apply to all actions and proceedings in the
courts of this state except as otherwise provided in Subdivisions (b) and (c).
(b) Rules inapplicable. The rules (other than with respect to privileges) do not
apply in the following situations:
(1) Preliminary questions of fact which are to be determined under Rule 104(a);
(2) Grand jury proceedings;
(3) Miscellaneous proceedings for extradition, sentencing or granting or
revocation of probation, issuance of warrants for arrest, criminal summonses
and search warrants and proceedings with respect to release on bail or
otherwise;
(4) Contempt proceedings in which the court may act summarily;
(c) In a criminal preliminary examination, reliable hearsay shall be admissible as
provided under Rule 1102.

UtahR. Evid. 1102
(a) Statement of the rule. Reliable hearsay is admissible at criminal preliminary
examinations.
(b) Definition of reliable hearsay. For purposes of criminal preliminary
examinations only, reliable hearsay includes:
(1) hearsay evidence admissible at trial under the Utah R.ules of Evidence;
(2) hearsay evidence admissible at trial under Rule 804 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence, regardless of the availability of the declarant at the preliminary
examination;
(3) evidence establishing the foundation for or the authenticity of any exhibit;
(4) scientific, laboratory, or forensic reports and records;
(5) medical and autopsy reports and records;
(6) a statement of a non-testifying peace officer to a testifying peace officer;
(7) a statement made by a child victim of physical abuse or a sexual offense
which is promptly reported by the child victim and recorded in accordance with
Rule 15.5 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure;
(8) a statement of a declarant that is written, recorded, or transcribed verbatim
which is:
(A) under oath or affirmation; or
(B) pursuant to a notification to the declarant that a false statement made
therein is punishable;
(9) other hearsay evidence with similar indicia of reliability, regardless of
admissibility at trial under Rules 803 and 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
(c) Continuance for production of additional evidence. If hearsay evidence is
proffered or admitted in the preliminary examination, a continuance of the hearing
may be granted for the purpose of furnishing additional evidence if:
(1) The magistrate finds that the hearsay evidence proffered or admitted is not
sufficient and additional evidence is necessary for a bindover; or
(2) The defense establishes that it would be so substantially and unfairly
disadvantaged by the use of the hearsay evidence as to outweigh the interests of
the declarant and the efficient administration of justice.
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24 form by Richard C. Tattoo, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in and
25 for the State of Utah.
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APPEARANCES

2
3
4 For the State of Utah:
5

Mr. Michael D. Jorgensen
Attorney at Law
37 North 100 East
Sallna, Utah 84654

6
7
8 For the Defendants:
9

Mr. Shelden Carter
Attorney at Law
3325 N. University Avenue #200
Provo, Utah 84604

10
11
12

PROCEEDINGS

13
THE COURT: Good morning ladies and gentlemen. The case that we call

14
at this time is the State of Utah vs. Mitchell Hill and Jeremy Edward Hill and they are

15
present in court and for the State of Utah Mr. Jorgensen and is it Mr. Carter?

16
MR. CARTER: Yes, Your Honor.

17
THE COURT: Mr. Carter representing the defendants. Mr. Jorgensen are

18
you prepared to go forward?

19
MR. JORGENSEN: We are Your Honor. Just one procedural matter. We

20
filed an amended information on Mr. Hill, Mitchell Hill excuse me and gave a copy to

21
Mr. Carter at this time. The court has it. It is already in the file. There are some

22
typographical errors and supposed to be identical to the charges against Mr. Mitchell

23
Hill and Mr. Jeremy Hill and the one against Mr. Mitchell Hill was incorrect so we

24
filed an amended information on those.

25
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1

MR. CARTER: Is this beingrecordedJudge ?

2

THE COURT: Yes, it is.

3

MR. CARTER: For the record we would object to the motion to amend

4 and I have just received it and have not even had an opportunity to review it at this
5 point
6

THE COURT: Mr. Jorgensen?

7

MR. JORGENSEN: I think the objection can be noted, Your Honor but I

8 think the status of the law as I read it, I have the right to amend at any time up until
9 the time of the trail in this matter.
10

MR. CARTER: I think that is factually correct and it catches us by surprise

11 and I think we are entitled to a continuance.
12

MR. JORGENSEN:. That is true, Your Honor, it is a surprise.

13

THE COURT: Is the information for Mitchell Hill exactly the same as for

14 Jeremy Hill?
15

MR. CARTER: That is what I am trying to locate Judge.

16

THE COURT: How could that create a problem?

17

MR. CARTER: I don't know. I am just looking it over at this point and

18 just trying to protect—
19

THE COURT: Do you need some time or need to go off the record.

20

MR. CARTER: I don't see any prejudice that would be caused. It looks

21 like it is.
22

THE COURT: Do you withdraw your motion?

23

MR. CARTER: Yes.

24

THE COURT: So are you prepared to go forward Mr. Carter?

25

MR. CARTER: Yes, we are.
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1

THE COURT: Okay, anything in opening Mr. Jorgensen?

2

MR. JORGENSEN: Just briefly, Your Honor, we would just call one

3 witness and testify with regard to the incidences on July the 16th involving Mr.
4 Jeremy Hill and Mr. Mitchell Hill.
3

THE COURT: Anything in opening Mr. Carter?

6

MR. CARTER: No, Judge..

7

THE COURT: Call yourfirstwitness Mr. Jorgensen.

8

MR. JORGENSEN: We would call Detective Clark Thomas to the stand.

9 1

THE COURT: Would you please come forward and be sworn by the clerk.

10
11

CLARK THOMAS

12 called as a witness by and on behalf of the State of Utah being first duly sworn by the
13 > Clerk of the Court was examined and testified as follows:
14
15

THE COURT: Please take the witness stand and state your name and your

16 occupation for the record.
17

THE WITNESS: My name is Clark Thomas. I am a detective with the

18 Central Utah Narcotic's Task Force.
19
DIRECT EXAMINATION

20
21
22

BY MR. JORGENSEN:

23

Q. How long have you been with the task force?

24

A. Just over a year.

25

Q . And can you briefly describe the duties as far as the task force?
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1

A. We work exclusively in narcotics investigations.

2

Q. And were you in Sanpete County, State of Utah on July the 16th of 1999?

3

A. Yes, I was.

4

Q. And tell us what you were doing?

5

A. Conducting a narcotics investigation.

6

Q Where did this take place?

7

A. In Mt Pleasant

8

Q- And with whom were you, who were you with?

9

A. Detective Jenkins and also the Central Utah Narcotics Task Force.

10

Q. And were you with a confidential informant?

11

A. Yes.

12

Q. Can you tell us at approximately 10:00 that night what was going on?

13

A. We had met with the confidential informant at a pre-arranged location. He was

14 given currency supplied by the Central Utah Narcotics Task Force and at thefirstwe
15 searched his person and the vehicle and then proceeded to the Triangle Bar that is
16 located in Mt. Pleasant, Utah.
17

Q- And was he wired at that point and time?

18

A. Yes, he was. A monitoring device was on his person.

19

Q. Was that monitoring device functioning?

20

A. Yes, it was.

21

Q. Did you listen to the conversations going on?

22

A. Yes.

23

Q. Did you go into the bar? Did he go into the Triangle Lounge in Mt. Pleasant,

24 Utah?
25

A. Yes sir.
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Q. With whom did he meet?

2

A. He met with Mitchell Hill.

3

Q. Can you tell us what you heard?

4

A. Mitchell Hill arranged for the sale of—

5

Page 6

MR. CARTER: We would object, Judge, he asked him what he heard not

6

to draw a conclusions about what happened. I mean, we would ask him to respond

7

appropriately to the question and actually tell us what was said instead of giving us

8

conclusions.

9
10
11 I
12

THE COURT: Mr. Jorgensen?
BYMR.JORGENSEN:
Q. Can you tell us what was said to the best of your recollection at this point and
time?

13

A. To the best of my recollection the confidential informant engaged in a

14

conversation with Mitchell Hill. Mitchell Hill had informed him that Jeremy Hill

15

would be there presently and that Jeremy Hill did have Methamphetamine for sale.

16

Q. Did Jeremy Hill eventually show up?

17

A. Yes.

18

Q. And can you tell us what happened at that point and time?

19

A. Jeremy Hill and the confidential information exited the bar and went to his

20

vehicle.

21
22
23

(WHEREUPON, the clerk indicated to the judge that there might be a problem with
the recording device and a recess was taken.)

24
25

THE COURT: Court is again in session after a pause for computer
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1 problems. The witness will again take the stand and I would remind you that you are
2 still under oath. Mr. Jorgensen, the record was correct up to the point that we recessed
3 and we were recording so you may proceedfromwhere you were at that point.
4 1

MR. JORGENSEN: If I can remember.

5

THE COURT: I hope your memory is better man mine.

6 BY MR. JORGENSEN:
7

Q. Mr. Thomas, I believe you previously testified that your confidential informant

8 had gone into the Triangle Lounge at Mt. Pleasant City, State of Utah, is that correct?
9

A. Yes, it is.

10

Q. Why don't we start from that point.

11

A. The confidential informant once he entered the Triangle Lounge eventually

12
13

Q. What did Mr. Hill tell him?

14

A. Mitchell Hill had informed him that Jeremy Hill would be there, I don't

15 remember the timeframe,that he would be there later that evening and that Jeremy
16 did indeed have Methamphetamine that the confidential informant could purchase.
17

Q. Mr. Hill did show up, Jeremy Hill?

18

A. Yes.

19

Q. And they went outside of the lounge, the bar?

20

A. Yes.

21

Q. And did you observe this?

22

A. Yes.

23

Q. And there was a transaction?

24

A. Yes, there was.

25

Q. And what was the nature of that transaction?
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A. What was purported to be one gram of Methamphetamine for $60.00.
Q. What action did you, what happened at that point and time after that?
A. Jeremy Hill and the confidential informant did converse for a while after that.
Subsequently, the confidential infomiant excused himself and was surveilled at the
pre-arranged location.
Q. Did you search the confidential information at that time?
A. Yes.
Q. And did he deliver anything to you?
A. Yes.
Q. What did he deliver to you?
A. What was purported to be the one gram of Methamphetamine.
Q. And what did you do with that substance?
A. It was placed in an evidence bag signed and sealed by myself and Detective
Jenkins and eventually placed in the evidence locker at the Sevier County Sheriffs
Office.
Q. Did you do any field tests on it?
A. I don't recall if we did or not.
Q. Based on your experience, tell us what your experience is?
A. It appeared to be Methamphetamine.
Q. Okay. And it was purported to be Methamphetamine?
A. Yes.
Q. The Triangle Lounge and the area where the transaction was located in Mt.
Pleasant City?
A. Yes.
Q. And can you tell us was there an arcade, church or school within a thousand
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1 feet of it?
2

A. Most definitely an arcade and a church and Wasatch Academy might even fail

3 within that thousand feet.
4

Q. How far away is the arcade approximately?

5!

A. One city block.

6

Q. And the church?

7

A. I don't believe it is quite a city block.

8

Q. These are standard 500 foot blocks?

9

A. I believe so.

10

Q. Do you have occasion again on July the 31st to be in Mt. Pleasant City or Mt.

11 Pleasant?
12

A. Yes.

13

Q. And why were you there?

14

A. Narcotics investigation.

15

Q. What time did that investigation start?

16

A. I will have to look at my report sir. (Indicating) It was approximately 12:30.

17

Q. Why were you there?

18

A. Well, I have to correct that. It was prior to 12:30. A confidential informant

19 had contacted us and informed us that Jeremy and Mitchell Hill were transporting to
20 Mt. Pleasant area a half an ounce of Methamphetamine.
21

Q. So what action did you then take?

22

A. The confidential informant was, a monitoring device was placed on his person

23 and arrangements were made with Jeremy and Mitchell Hill to meet the confidential
24 information at 64 West Main in Mt. Pleasant.
25

Q. Did that meeting take place?

1
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1

A. It did not

2

Q. What happened?

3

A. When Jeremy and Mitchell Hill arrived at the arranged location they were

4 arrested.
5

Q. And did you do that arrest?

6

A. I was present, yes sir.

1

Q. Can you tell us what happened?

$

A. Subsequently found in the vehicle was a glass pipe with residue and a half an

9 ounce of what field tested positive for Methamphetamine.

10

Q. And were both Mr. Jeremy Hill and Mitchell Hill present?

11

A. Yes.

12

Q. And why were you at 64 Main?

13

A. We were monitoring the confidential informant with the monitoring device

14 that was placed on him and also we had the area under surveillance.
15

Q. This is where the transaction was supposed to take place?

16

A. Yes.

17

Q. Again where is this in relation to the church, arcade or school?

18

A. It is right on the same city block 64 West main and I believe the Triangle

19 Lounge is probably 80 or 96 West Main. They are on the same city block sir.
20

Q. Then both Mr. Jeremy Hill and Mr. Mitchell Hill were present?

21

A. Yes sir.

22

Q. And you field tested the substance?

23

A. Yes.

24

Q. And it tested positive for what?

25

A. It tested positive for Methamphetamine.
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Q. Subsequent to the arrest, did you request anything else from Mr. Jeremy Hill
and Mr. Mitchell Hill?
A. Yes, they both provided urine samples and they were positive for
Methamphetamine.
Q. You briefly talked about certain things that were found in the truck. Can you
tell us what they were again?
A. I will have to refer to my report. Commander Piersonofthe Central Utah
Narcotics Task Force located a Camel Cigarette Container which containedMR. CARTER: We would object to any testimony coming from anybody
else other than this witness.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. CARTER: Do that on the basis of norightto confrontation to my
clients. They are supposed to under the constitution of the State of Utah and the
Federal Constitution.
MR. JORGENSEN: I believe this is reliable hearsay and admissible for
the purposes of a Preliminary Hearing pursuant to Rule 701.
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. You may answer the
question.
THE WITNESS: Commander Pierson located a Camel Cigarette container
which contained two yellowish rocky substances in two plastic bags which was
believed to be Methamphetamine under thefrontseat of this vehicle. Officer Wendell
Thayne of Adult, Parole and Probation recovered a glass pipe —
MR. CARTER: Your Honor, I don't mean to be obstreperous but I would
like to preserve my objection on the same grounds on the basis of confrontation that I
previously imposed and can I just have a continuing objection to any testimony
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1

relating to any other individuals that this officer does not have personal knowledge of.

2

THE COURT: Your objection is overruled. You may answer the question.

3

THE WITNESS: Officer Wendall Thayne of the Adult, Parole and

4

Probation recovered a glass pipe with a white powdery residue from a compartment

5

located on the driver's door of this vehicle.

6

BYMR.JORGENSEN:

7

Q. Did you have an interview with Mr. Jeremy Hill?

8

A. Yes.

9

Q. Was he advised of his Miranda Rights?

10

A. Yes.

11 I

Q. And did he indicate anything to you at that point and time?

12 1

A. He did.

13

Q. What was that?

14

A. I would have to refer to my report again. I am sorry. Jeremy Hill informed

15

members of the Task Force, myself included, that he had purchased this half ounce of

16

Methamphetamine from a contact in Salt Lake City.

17

Q. For what purpose?

18 I

A. He had arranged to sell this to a Mike that lived in the back of the video store

19

located at 64 West Main in Mt. Pleasant, Utah.

20 I

Q. Did Jeremy Hill indicate any use?

21

A. Yes, he freely admitted that his brother Mitchell and he had smoked some of

22
23

the Methamphetamine on the way from Salt Lake while traveling to Mt. Pleasant.
Q. I have no further questions.

24
25

CROSS EXAMINATION
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BY MR. CARTER:
Q. Officer on the 16th day of July of 1999, who was your confidential informant?
MR. JORGENSEN: I would object to that, Your Honor. I don't believe it
is appropriate at this point and time.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. CARTER: May I make a record for that one as well, Your Honor?
THE COURT: You may.
MR. CARTER: One of the difficulties we have is this officer is simply
providing a number of facts and events which he has no personal knowledge of which
I objected to on the basis of confrontation and of course that was overruled. Your
Honor, we are now in the area of the confidential informant which is kind of
foundational to the case and that witness if we are not able to even Cross Examine
and not even able to have location or identification of that it simply disenables us to
have an effective right to the Preliminary Hearing, that would be our argument. I
think the State is actually bound to produce the name and provide us that information.
MR. JORGENSEN: I agree eventually, we are, Your Honor, but for the
purpose of the Preliminary Hearing we are not.
THE COURT: Your motion is overruled.
BY MR. CARTER:
Q. This confidential informant and you searched him before the events of July the
16th of on the date of July the 16th prior to the supposed exchange?
A. Yes sir.
Q. All right. How did you do that? Did you do it personally or did somebody else
do that?
A. Myself and Detective Jenkins were present.
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1

Q. Where did that search take place?

2

A. At the pre-arranged location.

3

Q. Which would be?

4

A. I am not sure of the exact address. It was a dirt road in the fields west of Mt

5

Pleasant

6

Q. How did you search him?

7

A. A physical search.

8

Q. Just simply a pat down?

9

A. I would say it was a pretty extensive pat down.

10

Q. Did you ask him to disrobe or take off any articles of clothing?

11

A. No.

12

Q. Did you search his vehicle or did he have a vehicle?

13

A. Yes, we searched the vehicle.

14

Q. Was this the vehicle that he drove to that location?

15

A. Yes.

16

Q. How extensive a search did you conduct of that?

17

A. Very extensive.

18

Q. How is fairly extensive?

19

A. Under the seats, the glove compartment

20

Q. Under the dash?

21

A. Under the dash.

22

Q. Under the backseat?

23

A. Yes, it is a fairly extensive search.

24

Q. Did you go into the trunk?

25

A. No.
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Q. Is there a location in that vehicle where articles or some contraband such as

2 Methamphetamine might have been located that would not have been discovered by
3

yourself?

4

A. Possibly.

51

Q. All right. Would that also apply to the extent of the search of the person?

6 1

A. I don't believe so.

7J

Q. Allright,you didn't ask him to disrobe in any form or fashion?

8 1

A. No.

9 J

Q. You did what you call a pat down search?

10

A. Yes.

11

Q. And is that similar to a pat down search for weapons?

12

A. No, a little more extensive than a search for weapons.

13

Q. Did you ask him to empty his pockets?

14

A. Yes.

15

Q. And did he do that?

16

A. Yes.

17

Q. Did you ask him to take his socks off or anything of that nature?

18

A. I had him remove his shoes and roll the top of his socks down.

19

Q. All right. Did you ask him to look inside of his underwear or any place like

20 that?
211

A. I felt inside the waist band area.

22

Q. That would be the extent of the search?

23

A. Yes.

24

Q. Allright.Now I assume a similar search was conducted after what you report

25 to be the events of the sales of Methamphetamine on July the 16th correct?
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1

A. Yes sir.

2

Q. And it would be a similar search as well?

3

A. Yes.

4 1

Q. At at that time, did the person whoever it might be gave to you what you

5

purport to be Methamphetamine?

6

A. Yes sir.

7

Q. You didn't do a field test on it yourself?

8 1

A. I don't recall if we did.

9

Q. You don't know if anybody else did a field test on it, correct?

10

A. No.

11

Q. All right and we obviously don't have a lab results, correct?

12

A. No.

13

Q. Your information you are giving us today would be limited to your visual

14

observation of the supposed substance?

15

A. Yes sir.

16

Q. And we don't have a correct chain of evidence here from the supposed

17

informant to the time of the revealed search and your searching him post-incident and

18

delivering this post-Methamphetamine to him correct?

19

MR. JOREGENSEN: I object to that just because I lost track.

20

MR. CARTER: Probably a good objection. Let me restate it again.

21

THE COURT: You may.

22 BY MR. CARTER:
23

Q. Did you see where it might be;, did you maintain a constant surveillance from

24

the location where the supposed transaction occurred to the time of the delivery of the

25 I Methamphetamine and he was under your constant visual observation?
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1

A. Yes sir.

2

Q. He wasn't inside of a building?

3

A. From the time of the transaction to the time it took place, he might have went

4 back into the bar momentarily, but I don't recall sir.
5

Q. All right. So it would be fair to say that you didn't maintain him under

6 constant visual surveillance?
7

A. No sir, not when he was in the Triangle Lounge.

8

Q. There may have been a possibility that maybe he picked up some

9 Methamphetamine from somebody else or some other contraband from somebody
10 else?
11

A. I suppose it is possible.

12

Q. All right and that confidential informant is obviously not here today correct?

13

A. That is correct.

14

Q. All right. Is he still working under cover for your folks?

15

A. Yes.

16

Q. All right. And on the date of July the 16th can you tell me, well you report the

17 matter was monitored by surveillance equipment, correct?
18

A. Yes.

19

Q. And you have a tape of those events, correct?

20

A. Yes.

21

Q. And I think in your discussions with Mr. Jorgensen and I, you replied that you

22 would provide that to us within 30 days, correct?
23

A. Yes sir.

24

Q. All right and is that an audible tape and you listened to it, I am assuming?

25

A. Yes.
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1 I

Q. And it works and you can hear voices?

2

A. Yes.

3

Q. All right. And during that process can you tell me exactly what Mitchell Hill

4
5
6
7 I
8
9

said during that part of the events of July the 16th to the best you recall?
A. I have already testified to the best of my recollection that Mitchell Hill had
informed the confidential informant.
Q. Again, officer you are telling me conclusions of what you believe happened.
Tell me exactly what Mitchell Hill said if you could.
A. I don't recall the exact verbatim.

10

Q. Do you remember what your CI said?

11 I

A. No sir.

12

Q. All right That is one of the reasons-

13 J

A. We have the tape for evidence.

14

Q. All right. So you don't recall exactly what Mr. Mitchell Hill said or what your

15

CI said?

16

A. Not word for word, no.

17

Q. This CI, did you arrest him previously or what is the benefit of the bargain for

18

doing this exchange? I mean did you have him arrested for other charges and did you

19

say that you would dismiss these charges if he would go and get so many buys?

20
21
22
23

MR* JORGENSEN: I would object at this point and time. I don't think it
is relevant
MR. CARTER: It goes to the credibility. I ought to be able to at least
challenge that.

24

THE COURT: I will let you continue. Answer the question.

25

THE WITNESS: No, I hadn't previously arrested this informant.
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1 BY MR. CARTER:
2

Q. Were you compensating him financially?

3

A. No.

4

Q. Was it, what was it? Was he just simply a good citizen trying to clean up

5 drug trade?
6

A. I wouldn't say that

7

Q. What was his motivation for doing this?

8

MR. JORGENSEN: Your Honor, I am going to object, I think he is

9 obviously attempting to find out the identity at this point and time and we don't want
10 to divulge.
11

THE COURT: I want him to answer this question.

12
13 Central Utah Narcotics Task Force in the interests of a third party.
14 BY MR. CARTER:
15

Q. So he is doing it for somebody else?

16

A. Yes sir.

17

Q. I am assuming you don't want to tell me who that third party was?

18

A. No sir.

19

Q. What?

20

A. No, I don't

21

Q. And so he was working off some trade for somebody else's charges being

22 dismissed?
23

A. Yes sir.

24

Q. At this point Judge, for me to conduct, I think in fact of the Preliminary

25 Hearing on behalf of my client, I would ask that the court adjourn this process and
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1 reconvene at such time that the prosecution would feel comfortable in disclosing to
2 me who the confidential informant is.
3

THE COURT: Your motion is denied.

4 BY MR. CARTER:
5

Q. Tell me the criminal history regarding your confidential informant? Do you

6 know what that is?
7

A. I do.

8

Q. And do you know what prior history he had or she has?

9

A. Yes.

10

Q. And what is that?

11

A. 1 am not sure of the exact charges. 1 know that the informant is on probation

12 with the Adult Parole and Probation.
13

Q. Would that be for a felony charge, a misdemeanor charge?

14

A. I don't recall.

15

Q. All right So the person is on probation to some extent correct?

16

A. Yes.

17

Q. Do you know how many charges?

18

A. I don't

19

Q. Do you know, what I am going to is trustworthiness of your CI and do you

20 deem this person to be trustworthy?
21

A. This informant has been reliable on several occasions.

22

Q. Has he ever misrepresented facts to you?

23

A. Not to my knowledge.

24

Q. All right. Have you worked with him. Are you the person who has

25

supervision over this CI ?
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1

A. In the Task Force?

2

Q. Yes.

3

A. He has worked with a number of us that is on the task force. I wouldn't say I

4 was the supervisor.
5

Q. Would it be fair to say at this point you really don't know how reliable this

6 informant is?
7

A. I stated he has been reliable on numerous occasions in the past

8

Q. How many occasions is numerous? Has he worked with you on five cases or

9 more?
10

A. Or more.

11

Q. Ten or more?

12

A. Probably about that

13

Q. All right and has he ever misrepresented to you, lied to you, or led you astray?

14

A. I don't believe so.

15

Q. Regarding the events of July the 16th you tell us that you over heard some

16 conversations regarding Jeremy Hill correct?
17

A. Yes.

18

Q. Can you tell us exactly what Jeremy said and what your CI said at that time?

19

A. No, not word for word.

20

Q. And so after the conclusion of the discussions you and Jeremy and your CI and

21 the CI goes back into the bar and stays for a period of time, correct?
22

A. Probably just a few minutes.

23

Q. All right a few minutes be two minutes or is that five minutes, ten minutes, do

24 you know?
25

A. Probably two minutes or less.
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Q. I am assuming other people were inside the bar other than the confidential
informant?

3

A. Yes sir.

4 I

Q. Now at that point then the CI leaves?

5

A. Yes.

6

Q. Did Mr. Jeremy Hill or Mr. Mitchell Hill leave prior to the CI leaving the

7

Triangle Bar?

8

A. No.

9 I

Q. The CI still remained in the Triangle Bar?

10

A. Yes.

11

Q. Why didn't you go arrest Mr. Jeremy Hill or Mitchell Hill at that time?

12

A. We usually try and get more than one sale case on an individual.

13

Q. So you are holding back for another buy?

14

A. Or two or three.

15

Q. Did your CI tell you what history he had with either Jeremy or Mitchell Hill?

16

A. I don't recall.

17

Q. Did you give the CI any instructions, or courses, or education regarding issues

18

of entrapment?

19

A. Yes.

20 J

Q. What do you do to prevent the issues of entrapment from being made?

21 |

A. Every confidential informant we have, we have a packet that they fill out. It

22 | explains issues of entrapment, if they need any further explanation of that.
23 |

Q. Do you have a copy of that available?

24 I

A. I believe so.

25 I

Q. Do you mind producing copies of those documents, not particularly the
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1 documents used with this CI, but your general form that you use apparently with other
2 ! people and the CI?
3

A. Yes.

4

Q. Would that be okay?

5

A. I would have to clear it with my commander.

6

Q. Okay. Tell me about the date of July the 31st when did your CI contact you

7 regarding this proposed exchange?
8

A. It was in the morning of the 31st.

9

Q. What conversations did you hear between your CI and Mitchell Hill if any?

10

A. There is a conversation of the confidential informant and Mr. Hill that was

i i ! recorded on the monitoring device.
12
13

A. No, not word for word.

14

Q. All right and I am assuming that goes both for Mr. Mitchell Hill as well as

15 your CI?
16

A. Yes sir.

17

Q. And then I am assuming that is also true, that you don't have a memory of the

18 exact conversation between your CI and Jeremy Hill correct?
19

A. No, not word for word.

20

Q. Okay and again on these events of July the 31st we have no laboratory results

21 regarding whether this substance is Methamphetamine or not?
22

A. No.

23

Q. All right. Did you do a field test?

24

A. I believe I did on this one. I believe myself and Commander Pierson, there was

25 probably three or four of us involved in the field tests.
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Q. I do not note that in the report. Do you have an independent memory of that

2

yourself, or not that you did a field test, or that is somebody else relating to you what

3

they did?

4 I
5
6
7

A. No, I am fairly confident I was there when the field test was conducted on this
substance.
Q. And I am assuming you don't know other than you know sticking a tab in or
whatever you do, you don't know how the substance or agents work, correct?

8

A. Correct

9

Q. All right tell me about after your arrest what is your basis for the arrest of Mr.

10

Mitchell Hill or Jeremy Hill, you do not have a warrant of arrest, correct?

11

A. Correct

12

Q. You just what you believe to be what you overheard on your monitoring

13

devices?

14

A. Right

15

Q. All right, based upon that you arrest both Mitchell Hill and Jeremy Hill?

16

A. Yes.

17

Q. Did you ever see Mitchell Hill transfer narcotics to your CI?

18

A. No.

19

Q. You simply have Mr. Mitchell Hill being present at this location and I think it

20 I is 64 West Main, correct?
21 I

A. Yes sir.

22 I

Q. And that is it, he was just simply there?

23 I

A. Yes, he had arranged for the sale.

24 |

Q. Tell me what he did to arrange those? You tell me you don't remember. I

25 I would like to know what he did.
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1

A. I don't recall the exact phone conversation as I testified earlier.

2

Q. Okay. Exact phone conversation did you say?

3 I

A. Yes, the conversations for the arrangement.

4 J

Q. Were you listening via a phone to that conversation?

§ I

A. We had a monitoring device.

6

Q. On who?

7 1

A. On the confidential informant.

8 I

Q. So you were able to just hear what the confidential informant was saying?

9 J

A. I believe there is we can also hear Mitchell Hill.

10

Q. All right So ifl understand correctly, this is a phone call which you alleged

11 I to occur between Mitchell Hill and your CI and what you believe to be monitoring
12

and over hearing on the wire, correct?

13

A. Right.

14

Q. And that conversation is probably best picked upfromyour own CI, correct?

15

A. Yes.

16

Q. And then you may or may not be able to hear the conversations from allegedly

17

Mitchell Hill via the phone?

18

A. Right

19

Q. When you make the stop and detention of Mr. Jeremy Hill, is Mitchell Hill

20

present in the car at that time?

21

A. No, he wasn't

22

Q. He is separated from Mr. Jeremy Hill correct?

23

A. Right

24

Q. But at that point you decide to still arrest Mitchell Hill?

25

A. Yes.
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Q. When you get them to the police station you start asking Jeremy Hill
questions, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you ever advise him of hisrightsper the Miranda decision?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you tell me when that event took place? I do not see it in your report
A. I can't
Q. Did you do it or did somebody else do it?
A. I believe one of the other officers did.
Q. All right. Did you have him sign a waiver form or anything of that nature?
A. I don't recall.
Q. All right Tell me about this urine test What did you do to accomplish this
task of them providing a urine sample to you?
A. Can you clarify that The way we tested it or what?
Q. No, how did you approach them? Did you go up to Jeremy and Mitchell and
say that "hey, guys do you want to provide urine samples" and they said that "sure
you bet whatever you want" Is that how it happened?
A. Pretty much.
Q. You didn't say anything else to them?
A. It was a voluntaiy urine sample.
Q. Did you suggest to them you could get it by warrant or otherwise?
A. I don't recall.
Q. Did you make any comments regarding taking them to the hospital to obtain
the urine sample?
A. I don't recall.
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Q. Did you do anything to suggest to them then that in fact if they didn't comply

2 with your request that you would accomplish the urine sample by some other means?
3

A. I don't recall if we informed them that we could obtain a body fluid search

4 warrant or not I don't recall sir.
5

Q. And you say the glass pipe was found by some other officer?

6

A. Yes sir, Wendell Thayne.

7

Q. And the Methamphetamine was found by some other officer?

8

A. Commander Pierson.

9

Q. And this was in a vehicle that was fully driven by Jeremy Hill?

10

A. It was driven by Jeremy Hill.

11

Q. And Mitchell Hill was separate and outside of the vehicle when you conducted

12 your search of the vehicle?
13

A. They were both out of the vehicle when the search was conducted of the

14 vehicle.
15

Q. Nothing further..

16

THE COURT: Mr. Joregensen anything further?

17

MR. JORGENSEN: No further questions.

18

THE COURT: You may step down.

19

MR. JORGENSEN: The State would rest at this time.

20

MR. CARTER: For the record, Judge, I believe I know what the court is

21 going to do with my objection but I would again reinform that to my understanding
22 and to my satisfaction this has been a fairly ineffective Preliminary Hearing for the
23 benefits of my client because I have been disenabled in pursuing much of the line of
24 questioning due to my failure to to be able to confront witnesses. We find a
25 supposedly a glass pipe. We found supposedly Methamphetamine and I don't have
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the ability to challenge the chain of evidence. There is apparently a bunch of
conversations that go on that we really don't have a good idea of what was said or
what was not said or what the officer actually heard and did not overhear. We are
really relying a great deal on the confidential informant I would again ask the court to
adjourn this and allow us an extension so that we might be able to present witnesses
or call this officer or this confidential informant to this hearing due to our right of
confrontation.
THE COURT: The motion is well taken but denied You have the right at
this time Mr. Carter to proceed with a defense?
MR. CARTER: We would not put on any evidence at this time, Your
Honor. I would again probably for the basis of the motion to the court to dismiss the
preliminary hearing. I do not believe sufficient case exists at this time or information
is basically through Officer Thomas who is apparently kind of a point man, he is a
collaborator of all the data that has been produced. We don't have a lab test. We don't
even have a field test We have eye sight, looks pretty good, it looks like
Methamphetamine that is the best we have got 1 think that is not even sufficient for a
preliminary hearing although I would submit that the level of proof is substantially
less, but there is not been either lab test or any other test to document that this stuff is
Methamphetamine. At this point we would again reassert our right to confrontation.
We would also argue regarding Mitchell Hill that sufficient cause has been testified
binding him over even as an accomplice liability.
THE COURT: Mr. Jorgensen?
MR. JORGENSEN: Well, Your Honor, I think we have met our burden of
probable cause both on Mr. Jeremy Hill and Mr. Mitchell Hill and probable cause that
the crime is committed, probable cause has been submitted.
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THE COURT: The court finds in this case against Mitchell Hill and
Jeremy Hill that there is probable cause to believe that a crime was committed. The
court also finds that there is probable cause to believe that Mitchell Hill and Jeremy
Hill committed the crime as has been listed in the information submitted by the State
of Utah. The court hereby orders the defendants bound over to the Sixth District
Court for trial and at this time I am required to set a time for to set a trial date.
MR. JORGENSEN: No trial date, Your Honor, arraignment
THE COURT: Arraignment, no, no, I am sorry, you are right, arraignment.
I need to set an arraignment date and you need to look at your calendar. You need to
look at your calendar Mr. Carter and tell me if you arefreenext Wednesday?
MR. CARTER: I would like 30 days out if I could and the reason is they
are going to provide the tapes and some of the other documents.
THE COURT: That is fine.
MR. JORGENSEN: Your Honor, my suggestion is at least the cases are
one case is assigned to Judge Mower and one assigned to Judge Mclff and so it
doesn't matter which day you do it I think that the purpose of arraignment, Your
Honor, we could do it short of 30 days.
MR. CARTER: I may want to try and challenge them and bring the court
up to date regarding what I believe to be issues on right of confrontation, those tapes
and everything and they may provide all my answers and they may not
THE COURT: Okay 30 days.
THE CLERK: You are probably looking at the 27th, and that is Judge
Mclff s.
THE COURT: 27th day of October, is that all right with you Mr. Carter?
MR. CARTER: We are going to do that at 10:30?
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THE COURT: Yes, at 10:30 A.M.
MR. CARTER: Yes, that will work.
THE COURT: Okay. This matter will be set for the 27th of October at
10:30 A.M. this courtroom.
MR. CARTER: We appreciate that
THE COURT: You are welcome.

(WHEREUPON, the Preliminary Hearing ended.)
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